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TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF LABOUR LAW:
METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
ADINA SCHWARTZ*
1.

INTRODUCTION

This article will explore the methodological question that
underlies all work on the Jurisprudence of Labour Law. How are we
to develop an adequate theoretical basis for evaluating labour laws
as they exist in our societies today? What questions must we raise
in order to develop this normative theory? What must and can we
come to know? The goal of this paper is to argue against and suggest
an alternative to two methodological tenets that inform virtually all
work done in normative theory today.
I shall label the first tenet "the priority of pure normative
theory." According to this tenet, the primary task of the normative
theorist is to define and justify evaluative principles. These principles
are to be general in the sense of being applicable to all societies and
to all major institutions within any given society. The applied
normative theorist is to do the secondary work of using these principles to evaluate some particular institution(s) within some particular
society(ies).
On this methodological view, all the work of delineating the
proper standards of evaluation and saying why they are correct is
to be done by the "pure" theorist who defines and justifies general
principles. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the applied
theorist to attempt to justify or further define those standards of
evaluation as she or he uses them to judge particular social institutions. Rather, on this methodological view, all the work of empirically
investigating the particular institutions and societies to which the principles of evaluation are applied is properly relegated to the applied
theorist. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the pure theorist
to ground her or his attempts to delineate and justify standards of
evaluation in empirical investigations of particular institutions as they
exist in particular societies. According to this first tenet, empirical
investigation enters into the enterprise of normative theory only
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because the applied theorist must understand how particular
institutions operate and are structured before she or he can judge
whether they satisfy the principles the pure theorist has laid down.
The second methodological tenet which this paper aims to criticize
and suggest an alternative to will be labeled "metaethical
individualism." According to this tenet, the normative theorist is to
decide which social institutions and correlated relations among people
are legitimate by asking what the legitimate claims of the individual
are. The theorist's delineation of the individual's legitimate claims is
not to be grounded in any view about which social institutions and
relations are legitimate.
Metaethical individualism is an epistemological view about what
questions one must raise and what one must know in order to decide
that some, rather than other, social institutions and relations are
justified. It is not a normative view about the relative values to be
accorded to individuals, as opposed to institutions and correlated relations among people. Thus, this essay's rejection of metaethical
individualism is not to be equated with the position that it is more
important to uphold institutions and the relations they establish among
people than to honour any claims that individuals can or do put forth.
The rejection amounts, instead, to the position that a delineation of
the individual's legitimate claims cannot adequately ground an evaluation of social institutions and relations. Any such delineation can enable
one to rank alternative institutions and relations only if it already
presupposes a ranking.
The tenets of "the priority of pure normative theory" and of
"metaethical individualism" are not exclusively views about how to
develop an adequate basis for evaluating labour laws. Instead, they
are views about how to develop an adequate basis for evaluating any
institution which exists in any society, including labour laws as they
exist in the United States and Canada today. Although this essay's
main argument will be that those tenets must be rejected to develop
an adequate basis for evaluating a society's labour laws, that argument should suggest, more generally, that those tenets must be
rejected if an adequate basis is to be developed for evaluating any
social arrangement.
Thus, if this essay's argument succeeds, a consequence will be
that we, as American and Canadian social and legal theorists, cannot
adequately evaluate our societies' labour laws by simply applying
general principles of evaluation which were formed without considering what goes on in workplaces in the United States and Canada to-
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day. This includes the liberal principles and declarations about human
rights which David M. Beatty and Richard T. De George respectively
seek to apply in this volume. Nor can one assume, as Beatty and De
George seem to, that assertions about the rights that individuals have
can serve as a basis for ranking alternative labour laws without
already presupposing a ranking of alternative work arrangements. In
addition to showing that Beatty's, De George's, and any other approaches to the jurisprudence of labour law must be rejected insofar
as they rely on the tenets of the priority of pure normative theory
and of metaethical individualism, this essay will more generally suggest that any normative approach to any social issue will be inadequate to the extent that it relies on those tenets.
This article will accomplish these goals in the following manner.
Section 2 of this essay will present an account of the role work plays
in people's lives. Based on that account, section 3 will argue that
metaethical individualism must be rejected if an adequate basis is to
be developed for evaluating institutional arrangements of work. Section 4 will then urge that this basis can be developed only if the tenet
of the priority of pure normative theory is rejected along with
metaethical individualism. The essay will conclude by proposing an
alternative to these two methodological views and considering the
extent to which normative disagreements about institutional
arrangements of work can be rationally resolved.
In describing this plan, this essay speaks of delineating the role
of work, as opposed to labour laws, in people's lives. It also speaks
of considering how to evaluate institutional arrangements of work,
as opposed to labour laws. The foundation of this plan lies in the view
that in order to decide what sorts of laws should regulate work in
societies, one must first ask what work should be like in societies,
and then ask what, if any, sorts of legal regulations are likely to produce the requisite change or maintaining of conditions. Before answering these questions, it is necessary to raise the methodological question of this essay: how are we to decide between alternative views
about what work should be like in societies? To answer this, one must
begin by considering the role of work in people's lives.
2.

THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF

SOCIAL LIFE IN AND THROUGH WORK

This article claims that the role work plays in people's lives is,
that in and through work, people produce and reproduce their social
life. Extensive analysis is needed, however, before that claim can be
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either understood or accepted.' This analysis can best proceed by
separately considering three aspects of work: (1) what is produced
through work, (2) the work process itself, and (3) the distributional
structure implicit in both the products and process of work.
2.1

The Products Of Work

Starting with what is produced through work, it is obvious that
people through their work create the material basis for human life.
This material basis includes the food, shelter, and so forth that people must consume in order to survive. It also includes the technology
used to create these consumable goods and the technology in turn
used to create this technology. Since people expend this material basis
in order to live, people's work does and must continually recreate it.
The material basis that people produce and reproduce through
their work is not, however, the material basis for the survival of
human beings, simply as human beings. Instead, it is the material basis
for the survival and development of humans within particularforms
of social life. To start with, the consumable goods that people produce
through their work are never what humans qua humans must consume. Rather, people through their work produce specific forms of
food such as McDonald's and gourmet food, specific forms of shelter
such as prefabricated housing and renovated brownstones, specific
"nonmaterial" goods such as academic journals and pulp magazines.
Likewise, the technology that people produce through their work is
never what humans qua humans must use for creating what they must
consume. Instead, it is the means (for example, the automobile
assemblyline) whereby people standing in certain relations to each
other (for example, employment relations in which employees are
assumed to be interested in doing as little as possible for as much
pay as possible) can produce specific types of consumable goods (for
example, cars with planned obsolescence).

1. The claim that people produce and reproduce their social life in and through
work is central to the writings of Karl Marx. See, in particular, K. MARX. GRUNDRISSE:
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 88-100 (M. Nicolaus trans. 1973);
K. MARX AND F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY PART ONE WITH SELECTIONS FROM PARTS
Two AND THREE AND SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS 48-52 (C.J. Arthur ed. 1970); K. MARX,

CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 566-78 (F. Engels ed., S. Moore & E. Aveling
trans. 1967).
The goal in analyzing this claim is to produce an accurate description of the
world, as opposed to a faithful interpretation of Marx's views. Nor should this analysis
be read to imply that work is the only social sphere in which social life is produced
and reproduced. This is true, to a certain extent, of all social spheres.
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The production of these specific forms of consumable goods and
technology is not equivalent to the production of specific means for
satisfying the needs that all humans qua humans have. Rather, it is
the production of conditions for people's forming, maintaining, and/or
modifying ways of interacting with each other that are constitutive
of some, rather than other, forms of social life. These specific forms
of interaction are correlated with individuals having particular types
of abilities and inclinations. In other words, by producing specific forms
of consumable goods and technology, people produce a condition for
the existence of institutional structures distinguishing their own from
other societies. These institutional structures assign people particular
roles. This makes it possible for people to form some, rather than
others, of the relations with each other that are possible for human
beings. By thus making these distinctive social relations possible, the
production of specific forms of consumable goods and technology makes
it possible for people to form some, rather than others, of the abilities
and inclinations that humans are able to form.
As an illustration of this process of producing particular types
of social structures and relations and thereby individuals with particular types of traits, the production of academic journals is a condition without which the "publish or perish"' system which structures
relations among people in the academic community could not exist.
By being a condition for the existence of the "publish or perish"
system, the production of academic journals is thereby a condition
for the existence of the ambition to lengthen one's curriculum vitae
and for the correlated development of the writing abilities distinctive
of members of the academic community. Likewise, the upgrading of
American computer, but not steel, technology is a condition for changes
in the American educational system and in the relative wealth and
political power of various geographical regions. It is thereby a condition for fewer persons aiming to spend their worklives in the plants
where their fathers worked. It is also a condition for the growth of
computer "literacy."
In short, what people produce through their work is the material
basis for the development of some, rather than others, of the institutions, role structures, and relations among people that humans are
able to form. Derivatively, what people produce is the material basis
for themselves and others developing some, rather than others, of
the abilities and inclinations that are possible for human beings.
2. The "publish or perish" system refers to the system under which the quantity of publications is a primary determinant of whether a faculty member attains
tenure and receives other rewards available in the academic community.
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Two mistakes must be avoided in analyzing this process of social
and self production. On the one hand, this production must not be
understood as production from scratch. What sorts of consumable
goods and technology people at any giveri time and place can produce
depends on what sorts of consumable goods and technology they and
others through their work previously produced. It also depends on
the nature of the institutions, role structures, social relations, and
correlated abilities and inclinations that they and others previously
formed through consuming and using particular sorts of consumable
goods and technology. Since the material base that people can produce is thus always constrained by their previous production, there
are similar constraints on the forms of social life for which people's
work, at any given time and place, can provide the material base.
On the other hand, this constraint by previous production does
not mean that people are limited to reproducing the material base
and form of social life from which their work proceeds. Through their
work, people can change, as well as replicate, the types of consumable
goods and technology that they expend. Thereby, they can change,
as well as replicate, the institutions, role structures, social relations,
and abilities and inclinations from which their work proceeds.
However, the type and extent of change that people at any given
time and place can produce through their work is limited by the consumable goods and technology and forms of social life that they and
others previously produced.
2.2

The Work Process

From this account of how people produce, reproduce, and develop
their social life through the products of their work, the next consideration is how people do this in and through the work process itself.
Implicit in the preceding account of what people produce through work
is the crucial claim that, except in the freak case of a Robinson Crusoe,
work is never production by a solitary individual.' There is, in other
words, no such thing as a society wherein each person consumes and
uses only consumable goods and technology that she or he alone produced. Labour is divided in any society so that persons work to produce what others consume and use.
Societies differ crucially, however, in the nature and extents of
their divisions of labour. Of particular importance is the distinction
3. Marx frequently criticizes political economists for failing to recognize this.
See, K. MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71-83 (F. Engels ed., S. Moore
& E. Aveling trans. 1967).
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between the societal division of labour that obtains in all societies
and the detailed division that is significantly developed only in
industrial societies and whose growth has so far been correlated with
industrialization. Under the societal division, people's roles are to
specialize in producing various products that members of their society
use and consume. Thus, that division makes people goldsmiths, barrelmakers, priests, and so forth. In contrast, under the detailed division
of labour, people specialize in selected tasks involved in producing
various products. Thus, the detailed, or hierarchical, division of labour
makes people, on the one side, typists in typing pools, banktellers,
assemblyline workers, and so forth, and, on the other side, time-motion
study experts, personnel managers, and others specializing in allocating
4
tasks and deciding how they are to be performed.
Granted that what people do at work is thus to perform roles
within a division of labour, a division that differs in different societies,
the work process is a process of people's forming some, rather than
others, of the relations with others that it is possible for humans to
form. As people form these social relations, they shape themselves
into individuals having and exercising some, rather than others, of
the abilities and inclinations that are possible for human beings. Thus,
typing in a typing pool is inseparable from relating as a subordinate
to others who decide just what one should produce, the pace at which
one should work, and virtually every other detail as to how one's job
is to be performed. While people must thus act as subordinates and
superiors in order for work in the typing pool to go on, they cannot
so act without forming and exercising specific kinds and extents of
intelligence and initiative, including, for typists, substantially suppressing both.
At work, however, people do not necessarily form precisely those
social relations and abilities and inclinations demanded by their roles
within the existing division of labour. People may instead act to
sabotage that division. For example, significant numbers of American
assemblyline workers in the 1970's walked off jobs in the middle of
shifts, placed lighted cigarette butts in automobile hoods, and so on.'
4. Marx established and explored the concept of the detailed division of labor.
Id. at 350-59. For an account of the development of the detailed division of labor since
Marx's time and a detailed argument for the claim that industrial development has
been correlated with the refinement of this division and its extension to more and
more productive activities, see H. BRAVERMAN. LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE
DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974).
5. H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 31-35 (1974); WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK
FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH. EDUCATION. AND WELFARE xvi,
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The types of resistance of which people can conceive and achieve are
nonetheless shaped by the prevailing role structure. Thus, the rebellion
of assemblyline workers consisted of disobeying management's rules.
This is distinct from usurping management's role of deciding what
the enterprise's goals should be and how they are best performed.
By thus conforming and failing to conform to their roles within
the prevailing division of labour, people form social relations and
correlated individual traits that are constitutive of particular forms
of social life. In addition, conformity reinforces the institutionalized
role structure. Nonconformity may generate changes in that structure, but the structure itself circumscribes the nature and extent of
change. Thus, a common managerial response to sabotage on the
assemblyline is to increase, or attempt to create the appearance of
increasing, worker's decision-making power. Suggestion boxes may be
instituted; workers may be allowed to rotate jobs or to control the
assemblyline's pace. In all these experiments in worker participation,
the basic distinction between workers and management is maintained.'
As people's conformity, resistance, and responses to resistance
thus recreate and/or modify the prevailing division of labour, they
create the role demands that in the future shape the social relations
and correlated abilities and inclinations they and other members of
their society will form. This process of social and hence, self production in and through the work process evolves interdependently with
other social processes in and through which distinctive social relations and hence, selves are formed. For example, whether and to what
extent work force entrants conform to the demands of particular work
roles depends on the role expectations to which they are subject in
their families and in educational institutions. However, the roles that
people perform within a particular division of labour in turn shape
the expectations to which they subject their children in the family
and which they and professional educators seek to institutionalize in
schools.7
6.

For descriptions of some of these experiments, see WORK IN AMERICA:

REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND

WELFARE 96-110 (1973); H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 35-39 (1974); DESIGN OF JOBS: SELECTED
READINGS (L. Davis & J. Taylor eds. 1972); E. BUFFA, MODERN PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT: MANAGING THE OPERATIONS FUNCTION 232-33 (5th ed. 1977); Zwerdling, Workplace
Democracy: A Strategy for Survival, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1978, at 16-24; R. EDWARDS, CON.
TESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

155-56 (1979).

7.

For a description of the interactional development of role structures in

schools, families, and workplaces, see, S. BOWLES AND H. GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN
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2.3

The DistributionalStructure

To comprehend how people produce and reproduce their social
life in and through work, it is finally necessary to consider the distributional structure implicit in both the work process and the products
of work. The distributional structure involves how societies allocate
among their members the consumable goods and technology produced,
the natural resources used in production, and control over the labour
that people do. To understand how people develop distinctive social
relations and abilities and inclinations in and through work within particular distributional structures, the differences in these structures
must not be reduced to differences in how egalitarian they are.
Instead, a first basic difference lies in which natural resources
societies allocate. For example, Native American societies, at the time
of European settlement, left land free for the comer. In contrast, European societies at that time treated land as a resource that people could
own. People are able to form certain relations with others and correlated abilities and inclinations only if certain resources are or are
not allocated. The relations they form in turn reinforce or generate
change within a given allocation. Thus, the status of land as an
allocable resource within European, but not Native American, societies
of the Seventeenth century, made the Dutch, but not the Native
American occupants, able to conceive of Manhattan Island as an entity
that could be sold. This difference in the conceptions that the Dutch
and the native occupants were able to form in turn made possible
the basic change in the allocation of resources affected by the Dutch
"purchase" of Manhattan Island for $24.
A second basic difference in societies' distributional structures
lies in the entities to whom technology, natural resources, and control over labour are allocated, and in the rights granted in this allocation. Land, for example, may be allocated as commons in which
villagers share traditional rights, as property of various collectivities
in a socialist State, as individual property subject to varying kinds
and extents of government regulation. Technology may be the
property of the individual craftsman who uses it, of various state
agencies, of shareholders of corporations, and so forth. Control over
labour may be allocated through such institutional structures as
slavery, serfdom, the guild system, and wage labour.
A society's structures for allocating these various means of production are interdependent. For example, the growth of a wage labour
CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

Chap. 5 (1976).
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system depends on land not being left free for the comer.8 More
generally, workers must not individually own the technology and
natural resources used in performing their jobs. A society's system
of ownership of means of production also circumscribes its distribution of consumable goods. Differences in the quantity and quality of
what various members of a society consume cannot be as great, for
example, where immediate families own their means of production and
control their own labour as where such ownership and control is vested
in a few corporate or government officials.
While a society's system of ownership makes possible people's
developing only certain relations with others and hence becoming only
certain sorts of selves, that system is in turn recreated and/or modified
by the relations people form. Thus, those working within a wage labour
system have no choice but for their work to increase, decrease, or
maintain the relative profitability of firms. As they produce these
results, however, they may modify the system of ownership in which
they have worked. For example, ownership may become more concentrated as gaps increase in the profitability of large and small firms.
Concentration in turn changes the types of relations that may be
formed between employers and employees, for example, by eliminating
intimacy.
This account of how people produce, reproduce, and develop their
social life in and through work has separately considered how they
do this through the products of work, in and through the work process,
and in and through the distributional structure implicit in work. This
separation must in conclusion be seen as merely heuristic. A society's
division of labour, its system of ownership, and what its members
produce evolve interdependently. Thus, for example, the detailed division of labour first became widely feasible when various individuals
came together, in a single workplace, to work for the same capitalist.
That division in turn fuels capitalism's drive for profits by enabling
skilled workers to be replaced by unskilled ones who are easily trained
and replaced. Thereby, the continued existence and further development of the detailed division of labour has become a condition for
the continued viability of the capitalist system of ownership which
initially made it widely feasible. Likewise, the existence of the detailed
division of labour was a condition for the production of machinery
(for example, the assemblyline) designed to be operated by workers
who repeatedly perform simple mechanical motions. Investment in the
8.

Marx developed these claims in detail. K. MARX,

CAPITAL:

A

CRITIQUE OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY Vol. I (F. Engels ed., S. Moore & E. Aveling trans. 1967).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/4

Schwartz: Towards a Jurisprudence of Labour Law: Methodological Preliminar

METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES

1984]

production of such machinery has in turn made it difficult for the division of labour to be significantly changed.9
3.

THE INADEQUACY OF METAETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM

The above account of the role of work in people's lives was
developed for the purpose of considering: how is one to develop an
adequate theoretical basis for deciding what workplace institutions
should be like in the United States and Canada today? Contemporary
normative theory is dominated by a methodological tenet that section 1 of this essay labeled "metaethical individualism." According to
that tenet, the normative theorist's foundational task is to determine
what the legitimate claims of the individual are. Institutions and relations among people are then to be judged legitimate to the extent
that they honour the individual claims previously determined to be
legitimate. For this methodology to work, it must be possible to arrive
at a list of the individual's legitimate claims. This list must imply,
but not presuppose, the legitimacy of some, but not other, institutions
and relations among people. On the one hand, a ranking of institutions
and relations must be derivable from this list. On the other hand,
this list of the individual's legitimate claims must not in turn be based
on a conception of the individual assuming her or his involvement
in certain relations with others within certain institutions. A list based
on such a conception would already assume the legitimacy of some,
but not other, social institutions and relations.
The preceding account of the role of work in people's lives makes
it possible now to show that metaethical individualism is not an
adequate methodology for determining what workplace institutions
should be like in our societies. As has been seen, the members of
a society recreate and/or modify its material base, division of labour,
and system of ownership as they work with each other within these
institutional structures. They thereby recreate and/or modify the
distinctive social relations and derivative individual traits that they
have formed through working within their society's distinctive institutionalized work arrangements. Different institutional arrangements of
work thus differ from each other in the interpersonal relations that
people working within them form, and hence, in the sorts of individuals
that these people become. Due to this, a list of the individual's

9. For accounts of these interdependencies, see H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND
MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974); K.
MARX. CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Vol. I (F. Engels ed., S. Moore & E.
Aveling trans. 1967).
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legitimate claims implies a ranking of alternative workplace institutions and correlated social relations only if that list presupposes a
conception of the individual as related to others in certain ways within
certain workplace institutions.
This criticism of metaethical individualism can be developed by
considering various versions of that methodology. Certain metaethical
individualists, whom this article will label "intuitive rights theorists,"
hold that one can know, without argument, what the rights or
legitimate claims of the individual are. Social institutions and relations are to be evaluated by asking whether they honour these rights
that individuals are intuitively known to have. Other metaethical individualists hold that knowledge of the individual's legitimate claims
must be derived through considering the nature of the individual. Institutions and relations are to be ranked according to whether they
honour the individual claims that this consideration of the individual's
nature has shown to be legitimate. This essay will now argue that
unargued-for assertions that individuals have certain rights can imply a ranking of workplace institutions and correlated relations among
people only if those assertions in fact presuppose a conception of the
individual as related to others in certain ways within certain workplace
institutions. A similar difficulty will be argued with regard to attempts
to derive, through considering the nature of the individual, an account
of the individual's legitimate claims that can be used to evaluate
workplace institutions and relations.
3.1

Intuitive Rights Theories

The methodological view that social institutions and relations are
to be ranked by whether they honour the rights that individuals are
known, without argument, to have, is compatible with varying substantive views about what the rights of individuals are. In regard to work,
one type of substantive view is that each individual has a right to
develop or be her or himself at work so long as she or he does not
interfere with others. The other type of substantive view is that each
individual has a right to engage in some specific activity(ies) or to
be in some specific state(s) while at work. To criticize the intuitive
rights version of metaethical individualism, this article will consider
it as linked to instances of each of these two types of substantive
views. First, the article will consider the unsupported assertion that
each individual has a right to develop her or his own productive
capacities so long as she or he does not interfere with others. Then,
the article will consider the unsupported assertions that each individual
has a right to be employed and a right to free speech in the workplace.
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METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
Rights To Self-Development

One version of metaethical individualism grounds an evaluation
of institutional arrangements of work and correlated relations among
people in the assertion that each individual has a right to develop
her or his own productive capacities so long as she or he does not
interfere with others. For this version of metaethical individualism
to work, a ranking of institutions and relations must be implied by
this assertion about individual rights. At the same time, this assertion must not be interpreted to presuppose any particular society's
institutionalized definitions of productive capacities or interference
with others.
This two-pronged requirement cannot be met. As shown in section 2, the abilities and inclinations that a given individual is capable
of developing at work, and the products that she or he can produce
depend on the distinctive division of labour and system of ownership
within which she or he works and forms relations with the other
members of her or his society. They also depend on the particular
sorts of consumable goods and technology that have so far been produced in her or his society. The upshot of this is that it is impossible
to determine what any particular individual's productive capacities
are without considering her or him as working with others within
some particular institutional structures. Accordingly, alternative
institutional arrangements cannot be ranked by whether they enable
each person working within them to develop the productive capacities
that she or he has as a human being. A ranking follows only if each
person is considered as having productive capacities formed within
and defined by some, rather than other, institutional arrangements.
The assertion that each individual has a positive right to obtain
what she or he needs to develop her or his productive capacities so
long as she or he does not interfere with others must now be
distinguished from the assertion that each has a negative right not
to be legally prevented from developing these capacities so long as
she or he does not interfere with others. The preceding paragraph
shows that if this assertion is taken to assign positive rights, it implies
a ranking of institutional arrangements of work only if it is interpreted
to presuppose a ranking. The same difficulty obtains even if the assertion is taken to assign negative rights.
To distinguish between institutional arrangements that do and
do not respect the negative right to develop one's productive capacities
so long as one does not interfere with others, it must be possible
to determine whether actions that persons are legally prevented from
performing do or do not interfere with others. The problem is that
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whether a given action interferes with others cannot be determined
without considering that action as performed within some particular
division of labour and system of ownership. Thus, for example, in
societies where labour is divided in detail, some persons may have
the role of time-motion study expert. These persons are defined as
performing their jobs when they dictate the precise bodily movements
other workers employ. In contrast, persons who attempted similarly
to dictate to other workers would be defined as interfering with them
in societies where labour was not divided in detail. For another example, in the United States today, management is defined as exercising its prerogatives, rather than infringing on workers' own time, when
it makes overtime work a condition for holding a factory job. In contrast to pre-New Deal times, however, management is defined as interfering with workers when it refuses to pay extra for overtime.
The point of these examples is that one cannot distinguish
between workplace actions that do and do not interfere with others,
and hence, between laws that do and do not prevent such interference
unless one adopts the definitions of interference institutionalized in
some particular division of labour and system of ownership. Just as
with the productive capacities of any human individual, the "space"
which is a person's own and is not to be infringed is necessarily formed
within, and defined by, some particular institutional arrangement of
work. Accordingly, just as with the corresponding positive right, the
assertion that each individual has a negative right to develop her or
his own productive capacities so long as she or he does not interfere
with others implies a ranking of alternative institutional arrangements
of work only if it is interpreted to presuppose a ranking.
3.1.2.

Rights To Engage In Specific Activities

The above difficulty of being able to rank alternative institutional
arrangements of work by whether they respect a right of indivuduals
only if the right is already interpreted to presuppose a ranking, might
seem avoidable if metaethical individualism were linked with another
type of intuitive rights theory. Instead of attempting to ground an
evaluation of workplace institutions in assertions that persons have
rights to develop or be themselves and/or to be free from others'
interference, one's proposed ground might be that persons have rights
to engage in some specific activity(ies) and/or to be in some specific
state(s) while at work. As examples, take the specific rights to be
employed, to be informed of health hazards on the job, and to free
speech in the workplace. The problem with the type of intuitive rights
theory discussed in section 3.1 is that notions of what it means to
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develop or be oneself or to be free from interference can provide a
basis for ranking alternative work arrangements only if those notions
have surreptitiously been "filled in" to presuppose a ranking. In contrast, it might seem that without any such institutional "filler," assertions that persons have rights to be or do specific things can provide
a basis for ranking of work arrangements.
However, all attempts to ground a ranking of institutional
arrangements of work in assertions of specific individual rights, fail
for the same reason as attempts to ground a ranking in assertions
of individual rights to self-development or freedom from interference.
The problem with attempting to ground a ranking in assertions of
specific rights is that controversies that arise in particular societies
are seldom best described as controversies over whether individuals
have rights to be or do specific things. Instead, they tend to be controversies about what it means for specific rights to be honoured
within the context of a society's institutions. Thus, for example, there
is little controversy in the United States today over whether
individuals have rights to free speech. There is serious controversy,
however, about what rights to union advocacy are entailed by the
right to free speech. American legal cases accord serious attention
to three fundamentally different positions. The first position is that,
not withstanding rights to free speech, employers' property rights
entitle them to ban all union advocacy on their property. The second
is that employees' rights to free speech and employers' property rights
are suitably balanced by prohibiting all union solicitation by outside
organizers, but allowing union solicitation by all and only those
employees who are legally on the employer's property. The third position, to which serious attention is accorded in American legal cases,
is that the right to free speech demands that outside union organizers
be granted equal time, on an employer's property, to combat the
employer's anti-union campaign. 10
The claim that controversies in particular societies tend to be
over what it means to honour specific rights, is further illustrated
by considering the right to be employed. Is the right honoured so
long as no one is legally prevented from working for those who choose
to offer her or him a job? Alternatively, does the right impose an
affirmative obligation on the government to become the employer of
last resort? Or, is the right honoured only if measures are taken to
eliminate all private control over whether people are employed?
10. For consideration of these alternatives, see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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A choice between different positions about the meaning of rights
to be or do specific things must be made if alternative work
arrangements that are possible in a society are to be evaluated by
whether they honour those specific rights. Thus, the above examples
show that widely varying laws about union advocacy cannot be ranked
by whether they honour the right to free speech unless that right
is further defined. Further definition of the right to be employed is
similarly needed if government economic policies are to be ranked
by the respect they accord to that right. The problem is that the
requisite further definition of the states or activities in which persons have rights to be or to engage is a specification of them as occurring within the context of some, rather than others, of the work
arrangements a society can adopt. To generate a choice among policies,
a right to be employed must be interpreted as a right within a system
allocating certain kinds of control over labour power to certain persons and entities. Likewise, a right to free speech must be understood
as a right within a system giving employers certain rights to discipline
their workforce and control their property.
The upshot of this is that metaethical individualism fails when
linked to either of the two types of intuitive rights theories this essay
has distinguished. An evaluation of institutional arrangements of work
cannot be grounded in an assertion of a right to self-development
because an institutional ranking follows only if the self has
antecedently been defined as working within some particular institutional arrangement. Likewise, a right to engage in some specific
activity or to be in some specific state can generate a ranking of alternative work arrangements possible in a society, only if the activity
or state is antecedently understood as occurring within the context
of one of those arrangements.
3.2.

Conceptions Of The Individual

The intuitive rights version of metaethical individualism is not
the only version of that methodology. Thus, the above criticism of
the intuitive rights version does not suffice to show that metaethical
individualism is an inadequate methodology. While the intuitive rights
version attempts to ground an evaluation of institutions in assertions
that individuals have certain rights, the other major version of
metaethical individualism attempts to ground an evaluation of institutions in a conception of the nature of the individual and of what it
means to respect the individual. A criticism of this other version can
now be developed by considering three kinds of attempts to ground
an evaluation of institutional arrangements of work in a conception
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of the indivudual. The first is an attempt to evaluate institutions by
considering which ones individuals would choose if they abstracted
from all traits which they had only because of their membership in
particular societies. The second is an attempt to rank institutions by
whether they satisfy the wants of individuals. The third is an attempt
to evaluate institutions by whether they foster an ideal of individual
autonomy.
By considering these three types of attempts, this essay will now
argue that metaethical individualism is no more successful when linked
to conceptions of the individual than when linked to assertions of
individual rights. Indeed, attempts to ground an evaluation of
workplace institutions in a conception of the individual will be argued
to fail for the same type of reason as was argued above to cause the
failure of attempts to ground an evaluation of workplace institutions
in assertions of individual rights. A conception of the individual can
be the ultimate ground for evaluating instititutions only if it is a conception of the individual qua individual, as distinct from a conception
which presupposes that the individual relates to others within some
specific institutional arrangements. However, the only type of conception of the individual from which a ranking of alternative institutional arrangements of work can be derived, is a conception which
presupposes that the individual works within some particular institutional arrangements.
3.2.1.

Abstract Choice

John Rawls is the most prominent contemporary exponent of the
first type of attempt to ground an evaluation of institutions in a conception of the individual. This attempt consists of asking what
institutional arrangements individuals would choose if they abstracted
from all inclinations and abilities that they possess only because they
were particular members of particular societies. The institutional
arrangements that would be thus chosen are then identified as the
only justifiable arrangements. 1 This version of metaethical individualism
is advanced with the explicit goal of escaping the circularity of
evaluating institutions by whether they honour individual claims that
in themselves presuppose a ranking of institutions. However, it is no
more successful than the intuitive rights version at avoiding this
circularity.
11. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For an argument that any attempt,
including Rawls's, to derive social and political prescriptions from what abstract individuals would choose must fail, see Schwartz, Against Universality, J. PHIL. March,
1981, at 127-43.
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As argued above in sections 2 and 3.1, the abilities and inclinations that individuals are capable of developing at work and through
the products of work are necessarily formed within and defined by
some particular division of labour, system of ownership, and material
base. The same is true of the "space" which is a person's own and
is not to be infringed. Accordingly, if individuals abstracted from all
abilities and inclinations that they had only because they were particular members of particular societies, they would have no basis from
which to form any claims that could be satisfied within some, but not
other, institutional arrangements of work. The upshot of this is that
only a mistake can enable philosophers to identify some, rather than
other, institutionalized work arrangements as those that would be
chosen through this kind of abstract decision-making. Abilities and
inclinations formed within and defined by some particular division of
labour, system of ownership, and material base must falsely be seen
as abilities and inclinations that are common to all human beings.
3.2.2

Want-Regarding Theories

The second type of attempt to ground an evaluation of institutions in a conception of the individual is that of the want-regarding
theorist. As defined in this essay, the normative position of the wantregarding theorist is that the justifiability of institutions is a function of their satisfying people's wants. The correlated epistemological
position is that one can rank institutions by whether they satisfy individuals' wants without presupposing an institutional ranking in one's
index of evaluation. This epistemological view will be termed "the
want-regarding version of metaethical individualism."
The obvious criticism of this version of metaethical individualism
states that the wants that people seek to satisfy at work and through
the products of work are themselves produced in and through the
particular institutional structures within which people work. A bias
in favor of prevailing work structures is accordingly implicit whenever
alternative institutional arrangements of work are ranked by whether
they satisfy the wants that individuals have.
To this, the want-regarding theorist might reply that her or his
index of evaluation is not merely whether institutions satisfy currentlyheld wants. Institutions are to be ranked both by whether they satisfy
the wants that people currently have and by whether they lead people to form wants that will be easily satisfied. The wants that it will
be easiest for people to satisfy at work and through the products of
work may differ from those they form in and through these current
institutional structures within which they work. On these grounds,
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it might be urged that a want-regarding index of evaluation need not
be biased in favour of prevailing institutional arrangements of work.
The problem with this reply is that what wants it will be easy
for the members of a society to satisfy does not depend on human
nature per se. Institutions tend to encourage people to form wants
that will be easy to satisfy, to the extent that they encourage them
to form wants resembling those their society's particular institutions
have so far been developed to satisfy, and to lead people .to form.
Accordingly, an attempt to rank alternative institutional arrangements
that may be instituted in a society by whether they encourage the
formation of easily satisfiable wants has the same problem as an
attempt to base such a ranking on the satisfaction of current wants.
In either case, a bias in favour of prevailing institutions is incorporated
in the index of evaluation.
3.2.3

A Historically-Bounded Ideal Of Individual Autonomy

A third type of attempt to ground an evaluation of institutions
in a conception of the individual might be thought to circumvent the
criticisms so far advanced. This version of metaethical individualism
starts from the recognition that the abilities and inclinations that a
given individual is capable of developing at work and through the
products of work depend on the institutional structures within which
she or he and the other members of her or his society work. Despite
this recognition of human social dependency, a certain sort of
autonomy is nonetheless held to be achievable by human beings.
Individuals achieve autonomy to the extent that they develop and
exercise the requisite abilities and inclinations for rationally shaping
their lives to accord with their plans. Whether individuals are capable
of thus achieving autonomy or controlling the sorts of selves they
come to be in and through work is held to depend on their particular
society's division of labour, system of ownership, and material base.
Accordingly, this version of metaethical individualism is correlated
with the normative position that institutions are to be ranked by
whether they enable each person working within them to achieve
autonomy. 2
12.

This account of personal autonomy differs significantly from two more

common philosophical accounts. On those accounts, being autonomous is a matter of:
(1) being legally free to do as one wants, or (2) abstracting from one's particular personal history in deciding what to do or believe. In previous work, I argued that the

account of autonomy sketched above is superior to those two more common accounts,
particularly in providing a viable basis for evaluating alternative institutional arrangements of work. See, Schwartz, Against Universality,J. PHIL. March, 1981, at 127-43;
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The problem with attempting to ground an evaluation of institutional arrangements of work on whether they further this ideal of
individual autonomy is that no ranking of institutions can be derived
from this ideal. The reason for this is that people cannot individually
choose the sorts of lives they come to lead in and through work. As
we have seen, people recreate and/or modify their society's material
base, division of labour, and system of ownership as they work within
those institutional structures. Thereby, the members of a society
preserve and/or change the sorts of relations with others and
derivative abilities and inclinations that it is possible for them to form.
The choices that a given individual makes at work contribute to this
process of social and hence self production. What contribution these
choices make is not, however, within the individual's control.
Each individual lacks control because which, if any, institutional
changes emerge from her or his choices depends on how those choices
concatenate with those of others. Consider, for example, whether the
"publish or perish" system is in any way changed and, if so, how by
a junior faculty member's decision to give teaching first priority. What
effects this decision has on the institutionalized role expectations shaping the social relations and abilities and inclinations this person and
others within the academic community can form depends, among other
things, on: whether other junior people make similar decisions; how
students, job candidates, senior faculty, and university administrators
react; how each person's choices influence and are influenced by those
of others.
Clearly, no individual's plans can control how her or his choices
concatenate with those of others. Therefore, no individual can
deliberately shape the effects her or his choices have on the sorts
of consumable goods and technology produced in her or his society
and on its division of labour and system of ownership. However, we
have seen that by affecting the evolution of those institutional structures, an individual's choices crucially circumscribe what relations with
others and hence what abilities and inclinations it will later be possible
for her or him to form.
The upshot of this is that it is impossible to rank alternative
institutional arrangements of work by whether they facilitate each
individual's achievement of autonomy. On the one hand, the sort of
Meaningful Work, 92 ETHICS 634-646 (1982); and Autonomy in the Workplace, JUST
BOSINESS: INTRODUCTORY BUSINESS ETHICS (1984). Although I no longer accept these
articles' endorsements of the notion of personal autonomy sketched above, I continue
to accept their criticisms of the two more common accounts.
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self a person becomes depends on the form of social life she or he
and the other members of her or his society produce, reproduce, and
develop in and through work. On the other hand, no person can individually direct this process of social production by forming, revising, and pursuing her or his own plans. It is therefore impossible to
have a work structure wherein each person individually achieves
autonomy, or, in other words, controls, through rational planning, the
sort of person she or he comes to be in and through work. Since this
is impossible, alternative work structures cannot be differentiated by
whether they enable persons to achieve this ideal.
4.

IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE

The preceding criticisms jointly show that any account of the
individual's claims that implies a ranking of institutional arrangements
of work must already have been "filled in" to presuppose a ranking.
Thus, by arguing about what the individual's rights are or about the
nature of the individual, one cannot arrive at reasoned evaluations
of workplace institutions in one's particular society. To reach such
evaluations, one needs to argue directly about what institutions and
correlated relations among people should be like.
To pursue this direct argument, it is necessary to reject not only
metaethical individualism, but also an additional, widely-shared
methodological tenet. This is the tenet that section 1 of this essay
labelled "the priority of pure normative theory." According to this
tenet, the primary task, in normative theory is to delineate and justify
principles of evaluation that are applicable to all societies at all times.
This primary task is to be pursued by the "pure" theorist who neither
needs nor should consider how particular institutions operate and are
structured in particular societies. Particular facts are to be considered
only when the "applied" theorist pursues the secondary task of asking whether and how particular societies' institutions satisfy the principles of evaluation that the "pure" theorist has laid down.
The problem with these methodological directives is that it is
impossible reasonably to identify a given standard as the correct one
for evaluating workplace institutions in all places at all times. One
could reach such an identification reasonably only if one could do so
through reasoning in which one abstracted from all values, preferences,
and so forth that one had only because one was a particular member
of a particular society. However, the preceding section has shown that
reasoning from such an ahistorical standpoint is unable to yield criteria
sharp enough for ranking institutional arrangements of work. It follows
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that if one is to reasonably settle controversies about what institutional arrangements of work are justifiable for one's society, one cannot begin by asking: what are the standards to which justifiable
workplace institutions must conform in all places at all times? Instead,
the first question must be: what sorts of workplace institutions make
sense for the particular society in which one lives?
Viewing this as the first question means rejecting the distinction between pure and applied normative theory. Concommitantly,
attention to facts about the structure and operation of particular
institutions cannot be justifiably excused on grounds that one is
engaged in basic theoretical work. To argue reasonably about what
sorts of institutional arrangements of work make sense within the
context of one's particular society, one needs to ask what sorts of
arrangements are possible in one's society.
The question of what is possible is not to be narrowly conceived.
Relatively few proposals for maintaining or changing a society's
institutions are absolutely incapable of realization. To form reasonable
assessments of the realizability of various proposals, it is accordingly
often necessary to consider what sorts of changes instituting the proposals demand. It is also necessary to consider the costs attendant
on those changes.
To pursue these considerations, it is crucial to recognize that
the changes involved in instituting a proposed institutional arrangement of work are not only changes in a society's workplace institutions. As indicated in section 2, what sorts of institutional
arrangements of work can be developed and maintained in a society
depends on the relations with each other and abilities and inclinations that its members have so far formed. It also depends on what
sorts of non-work institutions (for example, what sorts of educational
systems and family structures) have so far been developed in that
society. In turn, a society's existing institutional arrangement of work
shapes both its non-work institutions and the social relations and
abilities and inclinations its members can form. To argue reasonably,
then, about the possibility of instituting and maintaining various
institutional arrangements of work in her or his society, the normative
theorist must ask: what sorts of changes in both work and non-work
institutions, in people's relations with each other, and in people's
abilities and inclinations are preconditions for instituting and maintaining those arrangements? The normative theorist must also consider what changes in work and non-work institutions and in social
relations and abilities and inclinations are likely to result from
instituting and maintaining those arrangements. To advance a reasoned
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view about whether a proposed institutional arrangement of work
makes sense within the context of her or his society, the normative
theorist must go on to assess the costs and benefits involved in all
these preconditions and consequences.
By pursuing this alternative to metaethical individualism and to
the priority of pure normative theory, we, as theorists, can reach a
limited amount of reasoned agreement about what workplace institutions should be like in our own societies. Some room is likely to remain
for reasonably disagreeing about what the preconditions and consequences are of instituting most proposed institutional arrangements
of work. Nonetheless, there are claims about preconditions and consequences about the truth of which it will not be possible reasonably
to disagree. For example, changes in childcare arrangements are indisputably necessary for the elimination of the sexual differentiation
in work roles which currently obtains in the United States.
Given agreement on what its preconditions and consequences are,
one can justifiably claim that a given institutional arrangement of work
makes sense within the context of one's particular society, only if one
can delineate the costs and benefits involved in instituting and maintaining it. One must also be able to show that one's judgments as
to which effects of preconditions and consequences are costs and
benefits and as to how great those costs and benefits are, accord
with values (for example, commitments to equality and to due process)
that the members of one's society hold or are able to form. The values
invoked must in turn be shown to be both internally consistent and
consistent with each other. They must also be shown not to rest, as,
for instance, the value of individual autonomy described in the
preceding section does, on misconceptions about what institutions and
relations among people are or can be like. Presumably, some of the
institutional arrangements of work realizable in a society are
ones that no member could reasonably claim passed these tests. Thus,
on this essay's alternative to metaethical individualism and to the
priority of pure normative theory, it is possible for people to reach
significant, justifiable agreement on which of the institutional arrangements of work that are realizable in their society are justifiable,
or, in other words, make sense for them, as members of their society.
At the same time, this essay's proposed alternative to the
methodologies of metaethical individualism and the priority of pure
normative theory, does not eliminate the possibility of members of
a society's reasonably disagreeing about what institutional
arrangements of work make sense for them. Disagreement can exist
even among persons who agree on what the preconditions and conseProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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quences are of instituting all the alternative arrangements under consideration. As indicated in section 2, people can resist, as well as conform to, the demands of their roles within their society's work structure. Although that structure circumscribes the types of resistance
of which people can conceive and achieve, struggles between those
conforming to and those resisting that structure in turn can change
as well as recreate the structure. The upshot is that the very work
structure of a society makes it possible for those working with it to
differ as to the value of various aspects of the structure. Those differing about this are rationally required to assess differently the costs
and benefits involved in maintaining that structure and instituting
various alternatives to it. Since this is so, different members of a
society are likely to reasonably differ about which of the institutional
arrangements of work that are realizable in their society, make sense
for them, as members of their society.
5.

CONCLUSION

By analyzing the role of work in people's lives (section 2), this
essay exhibited the inadequacy of two methodological tenets that inform virtually all work done in normative theory today. Section 3
showed that it is impossible to succeed at the metaethical individualist's attempt to ground an evaluation of institutions in conceptions of the individual or assertions of individual rights. Contra
the tenet of "the priority of pure normative theory," section 4 argued
that it is impossible to arrive at valid standards for evaluating the
institutions of all societies. Nor is it possible to arrive at reasoned
standards of evaluation without first attending to facts about the
operation of particular institutions within particular societies.
On the basis of these criticisms of "metaethical individualism"
and "the priority of pure normative theory," section 4 sketched a proposed, alternative methodology. Instead of considering the nature and
claims of the individual or searching for timelessly true standards of
evaluation, normative theorists should attend directly to the question
of what sorts of institutional arrangements make sense for them, as
members of their particular societies. By grounding their attempts
to answer this question in a consideration of facts about the operation of their society's institutions, theorists, within a society, can attain a limited amount of reasoned agreement about whether and how
their society's institutions should be maintained or changed. They can,
in addition, come to understand how and why members of their society differ in their evaluations of institutions.
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